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1DEBT SERVICE BURDEN OVERHANG REDUCTION: 
MORAL ECONOMY AND BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS
Reginald Herbold Green
Pacta servanda sunt.
(The contract must be honoured.)
- Mediaeval Commercial Law
Should we starve our children 
To pay our creditors?
- J. K. Nyerere, 1974
j r  v
D e b t  B u r d e n  a n d  O v e r h a n g  in  SSA
Africa South o f the Sahara has - in respect to the external debt service/export earnings ratio which 
is the best single measure - the highest external debt burden of all regions. This is especially true 
if full account is taken of debt which is not being serviced but, at least nominally, will need to be 
at some time in the future.
Roughly a quarter o f SSA's external earnings (earned import and debt service capacity) go to 
external debt service and over two-fifths would if all the debt were being serviced. The former is 
at the top o f the range usually estimated as viable for relatively buoyant economies with good 
export growth prospects (hardly a description of most in SSA) and the latter well above it.
The case for external * debt service burden reduction can be argued on four overlapping grounds:
a. the globalisation o f Adam Smith's moral economy imperative that if the majority o f a country's 
people were poor and miserable it could not be nationally strong and prosperous;
2b. the business reality that poor countries, enterprises and households are poor buyers, poor 
sources and poor payers and that chronic poverty amid chronic uncertainty is inconsistent with 
building up profitable business and identifying/capitalising on new opportunities;
c. the risk (however hard to quantify) to global security arising from chronic poverty and lack of 
hope exemplified in South African big businessman Anton Rupert's observation on Baotho 
households/Lesotho - "If they do not eat, we cannot sleep";
d. the ecological damage enforced by poverty from household through territorial economy levels.
A rough model - variable by country, temporal and external setting context - for mutual 
attainment of these three cases would - for poor and lower middle income economies - include:
a. sustainable trend 6% real output growth - if only to provide the resources to attain other 
goals;
b. external balance (visible and invisible exports and imports, remittances, debt service, 
concessional and commercial resource inflows) evolution consistent with averting the 6% 
growth trend being choked off by inability to meet import requirements;
c. human development and production by poor people enabling investment to ensure that "a" is 
sustainable, reduces absolute poverty and builds the human capital base increasingly necessary 
for economic success however defined.
In that context excessive external debt service obligations - whenever, however, whyever incurred 
- are a barrier to full attainment of all three objectives by engrossing resources, increasing 
uncertainty and a la Keynes worsening the "animal spirits" of entrepreneurs whether foreign or 
domestic, public or private.
C a s e s , C o n d it io n s  a n d  C o r r e c t io n  S u s t a in a b il it y
The best business practice and moral economy cases for eliminating external debt service burden 
overhang overlap. They are not, however, identical. The former applies virtually independent of 
political economic strategy and degree of commitment (or otherwise) to poverty reduction, 
probity and human development. The latter evidently does not.
3The possible conflict can be overstated. Totally corrupt or tyrannical regimes in recent decades 
have relatively poor performance records. Similarly, to require perfection in a country's 
governance (whether in broadly defined human rights terms or political economic strategy) before 
reduction of debt overhang is not a recipe for New Jerusalems but for new deadlocks. Perhaps 
inconveniently, several states whose broader political economic and especially human rights 
records are problematic - e.g. Singapore, Indonesia - are demonstrably effective in reducing 
absolute poverty and raising human investment (and almost any variant of the Human 
Development Index).
In practice, breakthroughs on debt burden/debt overhang reduction are likely only when both 
business and unofficial good development governance advocates abroad as well as domestically 
back a clearly reasoned, forcefully presented national case. Northern NGOs may be able to block, 
but not by themselves to cause. To block alone when domestic social sector and peoples groups 
advocate is to take on a serious responsibility (as analogously are efforts to ally with Senator 
Helms to end US support for IDA and, quite possible IDA on anything like the present scale with 
little likelihood o f a superior replacement).
Timing and conditionality are relevant - especially because in most cases in which major 
writedowns are at all likely, de facto  assented non-service of much of the external debt is an 
ongoing reality, e.g. Tanzania, Mozambique.
It may well not be desirable to have writedowns:
a. while an ongoing crisis makes new debt rollup inevitable - e.g. Zimbabwe or Mozambique 
before the end of the former's internal war and the South African ancien regime's 'forward 
policy';
b. a totally larcenous (or conceivably a totally economically inept) regime would clearly 
appropriate (waste) all or almost all the benefits, e.g. Nigeria today (arguably Zambia over 
much o f 1975-1995);
The points at issue are that backing ineptitude or ill-intent helps it to survive - hardly in most 
citizens' interest - while repetitive major writedowns are unlikely to be attainable. Conditionality 
is a more vexed point - especially as it is usually linked to phased writedown. Ideally, a 
writedown would be in support o f a domestic government strategy concurred in (and in part 
negotiated with) donors and would be either once for all or fully effective at once as to debt 
service flow reduction but suspendable for up to say - 12 or 18 months if resources were allocated 
(purloined) in a pattern grossly out of line with that proposed to secure the writedown. In
4practice, rather more detailed conditions and more phased writedowns are likely. In respect to 
limiting damage from four points are probably relevant:
a. the final reduced payment flow obligations should apply at once even if part are treated as 
suspended or tentatively rather than finally written off;
b. all targets should be either range or "best efforts" not point triggers - projections are neither 
technically nor prophetically good enough to bear the burden of the latter;
c. conditionality is technically better related to new flows than to writedowns o f old. New flows 
are projectable as necessary in virtually every actual prospective debt writedown case. Thus 
severe, long running conditionality on writedowns would appear to be market - as well as 
human being - unfriendly, rent seeking red tape and little more;
d. the writedown's purposes of restoring human development and sustainable economic growth 
cannot be achieved until real resource outflows are reduced (or in some cases capped) while 
the uncertainty reduction needed to allow more efficient domestic and external actor planning 
and performance is only very partially attainable until the writedown is irrevocable.
Because cloud burst negative shocks are a fact of life, but one not always projectable and very 
frequently one not projected, consideration as to how to cope with them - both domestically and 
by external actors - is needed in the context of external debt writedowns. This is particularly true 
because major writedowns are unlikely to be repeatable and probably would lead to genuine 
"moral hazard" (imprudent lending, borrowing, use appraisal and resource allocation) if they 
were:
a. exogenous crises (e.g. drought) should be an occasion for prompt external resource flows, for 
relaxation on a reasoned basis of domestic borrowing and monetary targets and for ex post 
refinance of obligations incurred to avert famine before food and related assistance arrived;
b. for genuine economic shocks (e.g. terms of trade) the IMF should revert to its stated prime 
purpose (now nearly totally abandoned in Africa) of providing bridging finance with the 
proviso that external co-operating partners should be ready to negotiate refinancing if the 
shock is unlikely to be self-reversing and is so large it cannot be met fully over 3 to 5 years by 
domestic changes without massive growth and development losses;
c. predictable economic shocks (context changes) such as WTO should be taken into account in 
concessional finance negotiations in the specific context of providing funds to strengthen
5future affected sector performance, e.g. rural research and supporting investment to bolster 
real grower net income and to reduce food import needs in the case of domestic food 
production and importation relating to what are projected to be the most genuinely adverse 
results o f the Uruguay GATT agreement's requirements in SSA.
" P a c t a  S e r v a n d a  S u n t " - S e r v ic e a b il it y  a n d  E x c e p t io n s
As an immutable commandment, "the contract must be honoured" can be a means of starving 
children, preventing growth, deepening and broadening poverty and inciting the violence of 
despair. However, as a flexible general tool for implementing transparency, accountability and 
predictability (by no means either generally undesirable or anti-human principles of good civil, 
political and economic governance) it has much to be said for it as a rule of thumb which is 
subject to defined exceptions.
A list of basic exceptions includes:
1. transactions integrally corrupted by fraud or bribery;
2. grossly exploitative contracts based on coercion or exploitation of major imbalances of 
information;
3. mutual imprudence o f lender and borrower;
4. events beyond the reasonable expectations of either party which have substantially altered the 
results o f performing the contract as stated;
5. economically imprudent for lender as well as borrower to repay in full on time because present 
value o f written down loan service and of other past writedown transactions exceeds those of 
full loan service and other future transactions without writedown;
6. full repayment on schedule economically and/or humanly disastrous to borrower.
The first five exceptions apply or have direct analogues in commercial and bankruptcy law and 
business practice. The sixth applies in personal bankruptcy and debt law. Indeed, in those 
contexts contract modification by negotiation, arbitration, equity law or statutory law is not at 
issue, only the appropriateness of specific cases and the degree of modification.
6The basic case for general external debt service burden writedowns turns on the last four 
categories, and especially the last three since mutual imprudence is usually a result of tunnel vision 
as to likely outcomes. The first two are applicable to affected (or infected) cases whether a 
general writedown case exists or not and are especially likely to be micro and enterprise related.
The degree of writedown justified on these grounds is neither precisely and objectively calculable 
nor totally vague with any demand or rejection justifiable on purely subjective grounds:
a. if the growth, human development and security conditions cited above are accepted 
appropriate macro writedowns under the human impact and business interest criteria can be 
projected;
b. while dependent on views of the appropriate target growth and human development rates are 
on reasonable external earnings projections the calculations are not necessarily much less hard 
than most economic (including project and enterprise) projections.
Such an approach does avoid the problems of writing down whenever a country does not pay 
(even if it could either literally or by not unreasonable reallocation o f resources^) and of 
automatically denying writedowns to a country because it is paying even if the price includes near 
stagnation or if roll forward rescheduling and temporarily condoned default has created a short 
term 'balance' of debt service and other demands. In practice, the latter point is more important - 
profligate non-payers are unlikely to win writedowns; only too cautious (to and beyond the point 
o f imprudence) payers in full are quite unlikely to be offered them.
The bottom line is achieving sustainable external debt service levels both as to total amount over 
time and time profile (i.e. spikes in repayment which will create severe constraints unless 
rescheduled). Total external debt face value can be misleading - e.g. $1 billion of 5 + 15 year IDA 
borrowing at 1% is less burdensome to service than SO. 1 billion of 5 year, 12.5% commercial 
bank borrowing. Similarly, how the reduction is achieved is secondary, e.g. converting a 5 year 
12.5% loan to a 10 year 5% loan is about as effective in present value of service reduction as a 
50% writedown of principal amount and may be more helpful in respect of annual service profile. 
By the same token any set of differential writedowns on different types of external debt adding up 
to the same total is about equally beneficial to any other to the borrower - even if not to individual 
lenders.
The case for differential writedowns and a package of modalities is that they may allow a higher 
total writedown and facilitate lenders agreeing on cost sharing. For example, most defaulted 
commercial credit (excluding lender state guaranteed) has been written off and/or recovered in
7higher prices on subsequent cash transactions while the bulk of foreign commercial bank loans 
have been very heavily provisioned/written down (in part against domestic tax liabilities) but both 
largely remain on the borrower and lender books as part of the debt overhang and generate 
uncertainty even if all parties view full future servicing as highly unlikely. Therefore, they are a 
plausible target for above average writedowns - the lenders have already (usually with tax 
provision help) take the loss and/or retrieved part of it on later transactions.
A particular problem arises in cases in which a substantial proportion of the external debt service 
burden rests on enterprises.3 This is not in general the case in SSA - except for publicly 
guaranteed (usually also public sector) enterprises, but could be significant in one or two cases as 
it is more frequently in Asia and Latin America.
No general dictum is practicable. The macro foreign balance and growth burden of making 
servicing possible falls on the state but, in general, writedowns avert severe damage to these 
whoever benefits at micro level from writedowns. Equally it is not self-evident that a state gain 
paralleled by continued catastrophe for domestic financing or directly trading/producing 
enterprises is preferable to direct channelling of the writedown gains to the borrowers. For 
example, if commercial banks and/or major producers have external debt service obligations made 
uncoverable by substantial devaluation there is usually a case at least for benefit sharing in respect 
to writedown gains (offsets).
O n  M o d a l i t i e s
No simple all country answer as to the appropriate degree of external debt burden writedown 
(from 0 to 100%) is possible, still less any sweeping pronunciamento on its efficiency vis-a-vis 
lending and/or concessional finance. However, in virtually all cases in which writedown is 
appropriate it will be as part of a combination of debt writedown, concessional finance and - 
probably - commercial lending. In that context debt writedown can allow more efficient use of 
concessional finance, less problematic (to lenders as well as borrowers) undertaking of new 
commercial loans and a less uncertain climate for external investment.
The most appropriate base for evaluating possible writedowns is debt burden: interest plus 
repayment at present discounted value and the temporal pattern of servicing obligations. 
Normally the best series to which to relate it is earned foreign exchange (i.e. import/debt service 
capacity), i.e. visible and invisible exports (including tourism and worker remittances).
8No absolute cut-off ratio of debt service burden to earned foreign exchange is appropriate albeit it 
is reasonable to presume annual flow ratios below 10% are most unlikely to justify writedowns 
and levels above 25% are very likely to do so. The import intensity o f the economy, the external 
finance intensity of investment and the prospects for external earnings are significant in estimating 
debt service ratios consistent with sustainable growth and development at - say - 6% per a n n u m . 4
One means to estimate writedown needed is to project over 10 years:
a. GDP at 6% compound growth,
b. Import (visible and invisible) levels consistent with "a" on reasonable structural assumptions;
c. Earned foreign exchange (visible and invisible exports plus net remittances) levels - on 
relatively conservative estimations;
d. External reserve increase requirements (say to 3 months external payments);
e. Net permanent external investment (excluding short term footloose financial capital and 
probably portfolio investment) computed as new investment less remitted profits plus 
repatriated capital;
f. Interest and repayment on new loans (commercial or concessional) projected as needed/taken 
up/received during the decade;
g. With (c + e) - (a + d + f) indicating manageable debt service burden levels on existing external 
debt stock year by year and for the decade.
This is not a particularly novel approach. It is very similar to that in World Bank evaluations of 
acceptable/efficiency debt service levels. It does not necessarily imply any impropriety or mutual 
miscalculation in any or all of the debt incurrance/extension nor, indeed, any philanthropic 
motives. It is, however, perfectly consistent with moral economy premises. The bottom line is 
that global macroeconomic and security (as much as humanitarian) interests are best served by 
debt service burdens compatible with 6% growth in poor/lower middle income economies and 
levels significantly above that are prima facie candidates for writedown.
How a writedown is achieved is a secondary (if doubtless central in negotiating actual packages) 
issue so long as present value of debt service burden is reduced by an agreed proportion and a 
practicable time profile for that service achieved:
9a. interest rate reductions, grace periods, extension of repayment period, additional concessional 
finance to service old loans^ are all acceptable if they achieve (singly or together) the level and 
pattern needs
b different proportions o f writedown (by class of credit, by country or institution, by particular 
characteristics o f particular lending transactions) are all acceptable albeit differences among 
countries (as lenders or homes of commercial sector lenders) and among particular 
projects/loans are likely to pose severe negotiating difficulties in many cases.^
In respect to both "a" and "b" the divergences of interest are basically among lenders - the bottom 
line for the debtor is total writedown whatever instruments are used and however the cost of 
those writedowns are divided among creditors.
Two contrasting problems arise in respect to debtors who are not servicing (and on reasonable 
projections can never be expected to service) significant proportions of their external debt and per 
contra those which have never had a substantial writedown, have re-entered the commercial 
borrowing market but have inefficiently high debt service burdens:
a. in the former case writedowns do not in fact free any present (or in some cases any substantial 
future) foreign exchange flows. What they do achieve is to create a climate of greater 
certainty for states, domestic enterprises, external lenders and foreign investors alike by 
removing a debt overhang which might - at least in theory - come crashing down. In such 
cases it is clearly inefficient to accept writedowns which reduce present concessional finance 
inflows significantly or - even in return for substantial writedowns - provide for substantial 
actual debt service which would not otherwise take place unless the latter is fully or 
predominately offset by additional concessional or quasi concessional finance. On the face of 
it, such "dead" debt overhang - e.g. enterprise commercial credit long in arrear and defaulted 
bank loans/guarantees should be subject to draconic writedowns - not least because 
enterprises (by above the going rate prices on later cash sales) and banks (by provisioning) 
usually have written them down.
b. in the latter case special problems of division of writedown burden arise. To seek an across- 
the-board cut including commercial lenders could prejudice the sustainability o f access to new 
commercial loans. Whether bilateral official lenders would accept making up the whole 
writedown is problematic. Possibly concessional loans (e.g. by IDA?) to buy back some high 
interest/short maturity commercial debt plus partial writedown of bilateral loans through 
retrospective conversion to grants would be practicable.?
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Writedown of World Bank and IMF lendings/facilities is perfectly feasible commercially if desired 
politically. It can be achieved through at least three modalities (separately or jointly):
a. de facto rolling over short/hard to long/soft facilities, e.g. ESAF for Higher Credit Tranche 
drawings; IDA credits for World Bank loans - as is being/has been done on a not insubstantial 
scale;
b. use o f profits from partial sales o f gold reserves (IMF) and of a portion of profits (Fund and 
Bank) for writedowns (albeit in the Bank case this could reduce their use to bolster IDA credit 
availability);
c. bilateral funding of a proportion of IMF/World Bank debt service - as already done in respect 
to arrears in several 'restart' packages (again with a risk of at least partial substitution rather 
than additionality).
The argument that overhang reduction will do little (or negative) good if it simply allows new 
overhang build-up is valid but - assuming either lender or debtor prudence - is unlikely to apply to 
very many cases. The cost - especially in Africa - of labouring under excess debt overhangs and 
the length of the period before temporary relief - let alone substantial writedown - strongly incline 
prudent governments against new borrowing sprees and the recent historical record should also 
lead to greater concessional and commercial lender and donor prudence.
G l o b a l i t y , E f f i c i e n c y , M is p l a c e d  M o n is m  A n d  A l l  T h a t
The argument over debt writedown or concessional finance or commercial lending is misplaced 
Carteseanism. At least two are likely to be prudent in almost all cases and all three outside a 
handful of least developed countries with structurally and secularly poor foreign exchange earning 
prospects. The formula suggested would yield 75% to 95% writedowns for a handful of 
countries, e.g. Mozambique, Tanzania, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia's successor state(s), but each 
would self-evidently need continued access to concessional finance even though prudent (for 
borrower as well as lender) use of commercial finance except via escrow account channelled 
protected export oriented projects) is likely to be quite limited.
In general it is likely to be more efficient to provide writedowns than to increase concessional 
finance for other purposes and, especially, than to raise commercial borrowing levels. One basic 
reason is fungibility. Tightly constrained finance - as to sources or to uses - is likely to have less
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impact than unconstrained. Earned foreign exchange freed from debt service is de facto  (as well 
as de jure) totally untied. A second reason is certainty/predictability. Debt overhang writedown - 
once achieved - sets new parameters and has a reasonably projectible impact. This cannot be said 
o f (readily reversible) increases in concessional or commercial lending flows. Therefore, it is 
likely - $ for $ - to have a position impact on public policy efficiency, business expectations and 
the "animal spirits o f entrepreneurs".
To stand the previous point on its head and argue that external debt writedown reduces 
lender/donor leverage and thereby can be expected to reduce efficiency of resource use/quality of 
public policy could be true but only under rather unrealistic assumptions. These go well beyond 
borrower imprudence (public and/or private) and/or corruption. (If both borrowers and lenders 
share these characteristics all resources will be inefficiently used in macro economic or human 
welfare terms, however sourced and whatever the nominal quasi public conditionalites.) It also 
requires that the economy after debt service writedowns either requires no capital account inflows 
or can find adequate footloose financial capital and/or foreign long term investment despite 
inappropriate policies. The former source can (vide Mexico and Pinochet Chile) work for a time 
but hardly indefinitely and logically can be prevented by IMF-Central Bank action with as well as 
without writedown. The second is rather unlikely with sound policies let alone with manifestly 
unsound. As to nil new external capital inflow requirements no low or lower middle income 
country has exhibited that is a sustained structural characteristic - Botswana did exhibit it for 
about a decade but appears to be the only case even for that long.
However, a caveat is needed. Substitution of actual concessional (let alone commercial) finance 
for otherwise unmet debt service is subtractional rather than additional and efficiency gains are 
rather unlikely to outweigh immediately usable resource volume losses. Further the usual context 
in which writedown is seriously discussed is one in which debt overhang and - perhaps - excessive 
actual debt service are preventing achieving adequate and sustainable growth levels despite 
substantial concessional finance and are also inhibiting external investment and either extending or 
accepting commercial loans. In such contexts at least some additionality to curent concessional 
flows (plus writedown of'dead' debt overhang 'lost' long ago but still on the books) is necessary 
to achieve any useful outcome.
To debate whether debt service burden writedown should be global or case by case is - on the 
face o f it - a confusion:
a. the formula is (and the principles underlying it are) inherently global, or at least poor and 
lower middle income country wide;
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b. the actual appropriate debt service writedown proportions (or, in practice, range since all ten 
year projects give more plausible range than point outcomes) will vary because the contexts 
vary;
c. the modalities and sharing of writedowns of necessity will be negotiated case by case 
(preferably in one or two fora) and then embodied in a substantial number o f bilateral 
contracts. However if what is being said is that lenders wish to require detailed case by case 
conditions - whether economic, political or social - prior to writedown, then the nature of the 
debate is clear - as is probable opposition to a formula approach to calculating appropriate 
writedown proportions. Whether removal of debt overhang is a particularly sound Christmas 
tree to bedeck with semi-related conditionality baubles is problematic but evidently these 
would be case by case.
W h a t  N e x t ?
The moral economy, business practice, security and ecology cases for external debt service burden 
writedowns for perhaps four-fifths of SSA economies are logically compelling. Practicable means 
to projecting needed writedown proportions in conjunction with future concessional finance, 
commercial lending and permanent external investment flow exist and are not, in themselves, 
particularly controversial.
The main barriers to action appear to be:
a. lack of a joint African state prioritised position backed by external friends for a formula based 
approach plus specific proposals on that basis from a number of countries;
b. lender arguments about moral hazard (presumptively of new debt overhang build-up) and of 
loss of leverage if the overhang is written off;
c. a distinct lack of any real sense of urgency or priority to reaching permanent resolution rather 
than ad hoc roll forward stopgaps by most lenders. 9
d. the general "the devil is in the detail" negotiating problem.
Without "a" - a coordinated African/external friend drive which is based on a plausible modality or 
short list of modalities and is reasonably photogenic - no speedy progress is likely. Somewhat 
over the top attributions of almost all SSA political and and socio economic debacles to real or
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nominal external debt sendee burdens by Northern NGOs and SSA critics plus some Northern 
academics with either no clear suggestions or an implicit 100% write-off for all proposal do not 
constitute a particularly efficient substitute.
f  he other issues seem to turn largely on misplaced donor perception that external debt (especially 
when not serviced) is an effective and necessary policy conditionality lever and on the 
complexities o f cost sharing among themselves. In the absence of significant African or domestic 
pressure it is easier for lenders to roll over and to take marginal to moderate unilateral write-off of 
specific loans (or to encourage globally marginal debt for ecology or debt for children 
distractions 10) rather than to attempt to negotiate general writedowns which would require facing 
up to conflicts o f interest (at least on cost sharing) among states and between states and private 
sector lenders.
Imaginative new formulae are not needed - the one here is basically a three year old World Bank 
one which, in a slightly different form, was used by Philippine non-official groups and their 
advisers up to a decade ago. Indeed more apparently competitive approaches may well splinter 
mobilisation and embrangle negotiation. Reasoned presentation of the interlocking moral 
economy - prudent business practice - security - ecology case may be useful. For historical (and 
perhaps presentational) reasons some lenders do view external debt service burden writedown in 
SSA as hysterical populism even if they have engaged in it elsewhere (not least in enterprise 
reconstruction and salvage -.e.g. the Chrysler and Rolls Royce cases). Therefore sober 
restatements may be useful as a parallel to mobilisation to attract attention.
Prospects are unclear. Intellectually the formula based writedown case has gained much broader 
acceptance since 1984. Then there was little perception that SSA even had a serious general debt 
service burden beyond a handful of academics, African central bankers and a minority of World 
Bank African programme professionals. Operationally much less has happened - the Paris Club 
approach has generated much sound and movement but very limited present value of burden 
writedown and no sustainable country level solutions. The same can be said of unilateral write­
offs (quite major relative to SSA bilateral loans from the UK and the Nordic countries) and of 
debt swops. Indeed the substitution of new IDA for old Bank window loans and of ESAF for 
standard Fund drawings - both partly conditioned by the institutions' need to avert a tidal wave of 
arrears build-ups or SAP collapses - may have made the largest single contribution to debt service 
burden reduction.
What happens next probably depends on how much sustained, reasoned coordinated pushing 
African countries and Northern, African and global NGOs and social sector organisations (e.g.
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religious, trade union and women's groups) exert. * 1 No basic lender interests could be 
compromised by reasoned writedowns, therefore a serious perceived nuisance from not acting 





1 A case for domestic debt service reduction can be made but is both more complicated and 
separable. In respect to enterprise obligations modern insolvency/reconstruction 
legislation is probably the key element. In respect to government debt the implications of 
writedowns for the domestic financial sector and economic uncertainty usually suggest 
interest rate and income tax policy are more prudent tools than direct assaults on 
outstanding obligations principle.
2. If Kenya chooses to allocate over $125 million to a presidential job and a secondary town 
international airport,not merely its case to borrow a similar amount on concessional terms 
for highway rehabilitation but also that for writedown of present outstanding debt service 
obligations is prejudiced. Sharing historic overhang losses is arguably justified however 
incurred (albeit less so if gross borrowing state imprudence/impropriety is a major 
contributing factor and the group responsible remains in power) but writedown de facto  to 
allow further self-evidently imprudent spending is not.
3. Prevention o f new debt overhang build-up would be substantially helped by states' not 
guaranteeing private borrowing (external and other), rarely guaranteeing public sector 
enterprise borrowing and - especially - not 'nationalising' non-guaranteed enterprise 
external borrowing once an external debt service burden debacle erupts. For this purpose 
state includes central banks and other public sector financial institutions. External lender - 
including IFC - pressure for such guarantees (directly or by lending to the state as 
intermediary) should be rejected.
4. Very uncertain earned foreign exchange evolution, high risk of exogenous calamities (e.g. 
drought) and/or over 40% present absolute poverty levels would create a presumption for 
a ratio o f 15% or less. Very high and low risk projected earned foreign exchange 
evolution and under 15% present absolute poverty levels might suggest 25% was not 
imprudent. Mozambique and Tanzania exemplify the first and Mauritius and the 
Seychelles the second category.
5. The World Bank's de facto  policy of refinancing debt service on old Bank loans with new 
IDA credits for certain SSA borrowers is an example - and one in which the refinancing 
represents a substantial writedown as do substitution of ESAP for standard IMF drawings. 
Bilateral cases include Japan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
6. Country differences will arise from differences by category whenever proportions of 
bilateral official, officially insured and standard commercial lending vary among creditors.
7. Both Zimbabwe - certainly - and the Philippines - probably - are examples of this 
category. The case o f escrow loans raised - usually very expensively - after general debt 
service collapsed in countries not servicing most present external debt is analogous.
8. Indeed it is by no means evident that present writedowns of such loans are universally 
smaller or harder to achieve than for bilateral ones.
b9. The World Bank - somewhat late in the day - is an exception in respect to analysis and 
quasi private positions but does not appear to have given the topic high - let alone high 
profile - priority because it believes lenders are determined to avoid resolution by 
writedown to maximise leverage whether this is logically reasonably necessary and 
appropriate or not.
10. The good faith o f UNICEF and of global ecology bodies - and, for that matter Northern 
government supporters - is not at issue. Nor is the possibility of modest gains in some 
cases. But no general SSA, or even single SSA country, resolution can be reached on 
these lines so that effort devoted to them does distract attention form the general 
writedown issue.
11. It is reasonable to argue that the World Bank - which now believes general formula 
informed, case by case writedowns to be prudent - should push its views harder and more 
publicly. It is unreasonable to expect them to launch a crusade on what it to them a 
significant but secondary issue.
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